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ABSTRACT 
In the light of endeavours for a Global System of Trade Preferences 
(GSTP) among developing countries, this article is concerned with the 
extent and structure of trade control measures in developing countries 
against imports of manufactures. More specifically, tariff charges, 
specific tariffs and quantitative restrictions are examined in selected 
developing countries. The analysis suggests that, given the present 
extent and structure of trade control measures in developing countries, 
a GSTP will probably create too little effective preferential margins 
to stimulate new South-South trade in manufactures. This seems to be 
especially true of the stimulation of South-South trade in capital 
goods, a major ground in the pleas for a preferential trading scheme 
among developing countries. 
GSTP, THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION AND SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE IN MANUFACTURES 
1. Introduction 
Developing countries' efforts to strengthen economie co-operation 
among themselves date from the 1960s. The early efforts largely aimed 
at the establishment of (sub-)regional economie integrations. In 1976, 
however, the Group of 77 launched the general principle of collective-
self-reliance as an overall development strategy, thereby widening the 
scope to embrace co-operation at an interregional level. A major 
element in the collective-self-reliance concept is the creation of a 
preferential trading scheme among developing countries, known as the 
Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP). In successive stages, the 
GSTP has since then matured and concretized. GSTP has been vividly 
pursued and actively supported by UNCTAD virtually from its inception 
(UNCTAD, 1986). 
The recent policy interest in the promotion of South-South trade 
is based on the wide-spread idea that the "engine of growth" of South-
North trade is slowing down, due to slackening economie growth and 
increasing protectionism in the North (Lewis, 1980). South-South trade 
should become an alternative source of self-sustained growth in 
developing countries. A significant role is destined for the capital 
goods sector. The more advanced developing countries are expected to 
provide technologies and products more appropriate for developing 
countries, and probably cheaper, than the traditional sources of supply 
in the North. By setting on a process of import substitution for 
capital goods in the -South, the capital goods sector may act as a 
generator and transmitter of skills and technology among developing 
countries. The efficiency of this import-substitution process is served 
by specialization and by output levels surpassing a minimum scale of 
production. This can be realized by increasing South-South trade in 
capital goods. A GSTP among developing countries should give this trade 
a competitive edge (Lall, 1985). 
The first round of negotiations on GSTP went underway in 1987, in 
principle attended by about 70 countries. This first round is 
characterized by a cautions disposition and modest objectives. The 
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starting point is a limited initial linear tariff reduction of 10 to 20 
per cent. This basie approach, however, is amended by quite a number of 
provisions and adaptations (UNCTAD, 1980). General provisions are 
included in favour of least developed countries, while specific 
provisions are envisaged for sensitive products. Safeguard clauses for 
unforeseen difficulties or balance-of-payments problems are also 
envisaged. Supplementary negotiations seem necessary to arrive at a 
balancing of concessions. In this connection, non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) should be closely interrelated with tariff negotiations, as the 
GSTP should not only rely on tariff concessions. In f act, the first 
round boils down to a combination of a linear approach and complicated 
and time-consuming product-by-product negotiations. To avoid 
invalidation of tariff concessions, at least a standstill is suggested 
in the area of NTBs. 
In the light of a GSTP, this study is concerned with the extent 
and structure of trade control measures (TCMs) in developing countries 
against imports of manufactures. Transnationally, both tariff charges 
and quantitative restrictions (QRs) are examined in selected developing 
countries. 
2. Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries 
Since World War II, developed countries have, in the framework of 
multilateral trade negotiations under auspices of the GATT, 
increasingly freed their mutual trade from TCMs, especially in the 
field of tariffs. After the Tokyo Round negotiations, concluded in 
1979, simple average tariffs on imports of semi-finished and finished 
manufactures were 6.6 per cent in the United States and the European 
Community and 6.4 per cent in Japan (Balassa and Balassa, 1984, p. 
181). Tariffs on import trade with developing countries were generally 
higher than on trade among developed countries. Recently, however, the 
developed countries came to a turning-point in their trade policies by 
starting to extent import restictions. Generally, these restrictions 
have taken the form of NTBs to protect domestic suppliers against 
increased import competition of manufactures from especially Japan and 
the newly industrializing countries. The renewed introduction of 
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protectionist measures in the developed countries has brought about a 
growing interest by economists in what is referred to as the political 
economy of protection (Frey, 1985). In this line of approach, the 
inter-industry structure and the level of protection in an economy is 
the result of the interplay of market forces in the political market 
for protection. Actors in this market are, on the one hand, particular 
interest groups and associated groups of voters, and on the other hand, 
politicians and officials who seek to maximize their public support 
through the ballot box. Empirical research to explain prevailing inter-
industry s'tructures of protection in developed countries has identified 
that import-competing industries which have a comparative disadvantage 
are likely to receive a higher rate of protection (Cline, 1984, App.C; 
Anderson and Baldwin, 1981). 
There are several reasons to assume that the inter-industry 
structure and level of protection prevailing in developing countries 
cannot adequately be understood with the political market model for 
protection. This can, first of all, be attributed to a fundamental 
difference in protectionist pressures between developed and developing 
countries. The new protectionism of recent years in developed countries 
is principally defensive in nature. Since World War II, developing 
countries erected protective barriers around their domestic markets to 
establish manufacturing industries which were hardly developed yet at 
that time. The protection of domestic industry inherent to this import-
substitution strategy of industrialization could be justified by the 
infant-industry argument. Protection of this kind can very well be 
characterized as principally offensive by nature. This is not to say 
that no defensive forces are present in the protected import-
substitution 'sectors in developing countries nowadays. After a 
satisfying growth record of manufacturing output during the 1950s and 
1960s, the domestic market of light manufactures in a growing number of 
developing countries began to show signs of saturation. The further 
development of light industry became impeded by the limitations of the 
domestic market, especially so in smaller developing countries. This 
necessitated a reconsideration of industrialization strategy. In some 
developing countries the call for both higher protection and a more 
made-to-measure system of protection was met, whether or not in 
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combination with a higher level of protection for intermediate and 
producer goods industries. The latter implies extending the import-
substitution strategy to the second phase, a policy option that is 
economically only feasible for the larger countries, due to important 
economies of scale that are characteristic for these production 
processes. An increasing number of especially smaller developing 
countries has sought to embark on an export-oriented industrialization 
strategy. By far in most cases, however, this policy shift has been 
partial: industries producing for the domestic market still continue to 
produce under import-substitution conditions, whereas the inherent 
discrimination against exports is reduced via subsidies and a duty-free 
import of intermediates and capital goods (Verbruggen, 1987, Chs. 11-
17). Generally, protectionist policies in developing countries tend to 
become ever stronger, pervasive and diverse during the postwar period. 
Once a protected domestic market has come into existence, vested 
interests that depend on the continuance of protection are created with 
the advance of time. An initially offensive policy can therefore very 
well turn into a defensive one if protection has been afforded long 
enough.-
Second, especially in developing countries, balance-of-payments 
policies and industrial development policies are often strongly 
interrelated (Gorden, 1980). In many a developing country, the 
imposition of import-restraining devices to cope with an alarming 
balance-of-payments deficit laid the basis for what later became a more 
elaborate policy to foster industrial development. This was initially 
not intended, but the TCMs remained and provided protection for 
industrial activities. A set of TCMs usually constitutes an integral 
part of an industrial development strategy once this has been 
explicitly formulated. But again, recurrent balance-of-payments 
problems may induce additional TCMs which in turn afford additional 
protection. Protection that is achieved as a by-product of balance-of-
payments considerations does not necessarely fit in with the industrial 
development objectives. In developing countries, TCMs to rectify 
balance-of-payments problems especially put a quantitative limit on 
imports of non-essentials or luxury goods. 
Third, unlike in developed countries, tariff revenues constitute 
4 
an important part of public revenue in many developing countries. At 
lower levels of development, taxing both import and export trade is 
often the least costly way of tax collection, due to the 
underdevelopment or inefficiency of a tax collection system (Corden, 
1978, Gh. 4; Greenaway, 1981). Therefore, governments in such countries 
may pursue a specific trade policy for revenue purposes only, or at 
least with less attention to the economie consequences of the trade 
intervention measures. 
Fourth, governments in developing countries often reduce the level 
of trade because of a mixture of political, ideological and economie-
strategie reasons. These so-called non-economic arguments for 
protection are by no means a prerogative of developing countries only, 
but some of these are indeed especially applicable to theif problems 
(Corden, 1978, Ch. 11; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983, Ch.24). For 
instance, the instability of export receipts from primary commodities 
as well as the supposed downward trend in the commodity terms of trade 
of developing countries warrant a strategy to reallocate resources out 
of primary production and hence protection of manufacturing. In more 
general terms, many developing countries seek or have sought an 
increasing self-sufficiency in order to reduce external dependence, to 
minimize the impact of external shocks on the domestic economy, to give 
the development of indigenous technology a bet-ter chance, or to meet 
other more ideological objectives to partially withdraw from the world 
economy as such. Furthermore, production in certain sectors may be 
provided with additional protection in the framework of a national food 
strategy, like the domestic production of fertilizers or agricultural 
machinery. The same goes for industries involved in the production of 
military goods for the sake of national defence. Finally, it is a 
common practice in developing countries to reduce luxury consumption, 
either by consumption taxes or import barriers, or both. The motivation 
often sterns from balance-of-payments considerations, but not 
infrequently ideological or religous grounds also play a role. The 
sometimes heavy taxation of alcoholic beverages and tobacco is a case 
in point. 
In sum, the above considerations suggest that the grounds for 
protection in developing countries may be rather different from those 
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in the developed countries; in fact, the arguments used in developing 
countries in favour of protection may even be mutually inconsistent. 
3. Measuring TCMs 
Also if we limit ourselves to concrete trade barriers, that is to 
say to deliberately and publicly introduced and 'visible' TCMs, the ir 
diversity is impressive. A list of TCMs to be found in practice is 
never complete. For that reason, TCMs are commonly analyzed by type of 
measure. Various classifications are in use by international 
organizations and for analytical purposes, and not all of them are 
readily comparable. In this study, use will be made of a classification 
designed by the Trade Information System of UNCTAD. This classification 
distinguishes 22 main types of TCMs, both import and export control 
measures; see appendix A. The import control measures include tariff 
charges, additional fiscal charges, service charges" and sales taxes 
levied at importation, QRs, money and finance measures, state trading 
monopoly, preferential trading arrangements "and special entry 
procedures. These measures, which apply usually at a product level, are 
all intended to affect the volume, stucture and direction of trade 
flows. Yet, these measure vary strongly in nature and effect; the 
direction of the effect of some is even unknown beforehand. 
Only a restricted selection of the most unambiguously trade-
restraining TCMs included in UNCTAD's Trade Information System will be 
investigated in this paper. This means an examination of the categories 
of tariff charges and QRs. These categories comprise the following 
measures (UNCTAD, 1984, pp. 6-8). 
Tariff charges 
1. Customs duties 
2. Fiscal duties 
Quantitative restrictions 
1. Restrictive licensing 
1.1 Exceptional licence for goods normally prohibited 
1.2 Licence covering specified commodities and granted if 
administrative requirements are met 
1.3 Licence covering specified commodities and granted on a 
case-by-case basis 
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1.4 Licence conditioned by purchase of local goods 
1.5 Licence for imports from specified partner countries 
1.6 Licence conditioned by the availability of external 
financing 
2. Quotas 
2.1 Product quotas 
2.2 Country quotas 
2.3 Tariff quotas 
2.4 Quotas linked with export performance 
2.5 Seasonal quotas 
2.6 Quotas n.e.s. 
3. Prohibitions 
3.1 Total prohibition 
3.2 Seasonal prohibition (agricultural products) 
3.3 Temporary prohibition 
3.4 Prohibition with exception for selected countries 
3.5 Prohibition for commercial purposes 
3.6 Prohibition for certain areas of the importing country 
3.7 Prohibition of imports from specified countries 
Among other TCMs, the Trade Information System provides per 
country tariff charges and QRs on the tariff line level according to 
the classification scheme of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature, the CCCN 
code, see Appendix B. This very disaggregated level . involves a great 
many items, per country ranging from 1,600 to 7,700 for manufactures 
only. 
To begin with, average ad valorem tariff charges on imports of 
manufactures are calculated. There are two main types of import 
tariffs. One is the ad valorem tariff rate which raises the price of 
the import in the domestic market with the height of the tariff rate, 
usually expressed as a fixed percentage of the import price. The other 
is the specifie tariff rate, aiming at the same effect as an ad valorem 
tariff but expressed as a fixed rate per physical unit of the import. 
In most countries, both types of import tariffs are applied and in some 
countries the tariff is even composed of two parts, namely a specifie 
one that usually adds to an ad valorem rate. All tariff lines that are 
ef f ected by a specif ie rate, or by both an ad valorem and a specif ie 
rate, are excluded from the averaging. These types of tarif f s are 
examined with the method of measurement for QRs described below. 
When both unweighted and import-weighted average tariffs are 
calculated, the well-known qualifications have to be made here. In 
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using unweighted tariff averages, an equal weight is given to all 
tariff line entries. Weighting by the country's own product composition 
of output or value added is preferable, but simply out of the question 
due to lack of production data on such a disaggregated level. The 
alternative of weighting by the country's composition of import is 
indeed possible, but yields downward-biased estimates. Implicitly, high 
tariff rates are then given small weights and low tariff rates large 
weights, as high tariffs will generally be associated with lower 
imports and vice versa. Two indices will be used to gauge the impact 
of QRs on developing countries' import trade. The first index is a 
simple frequency index, showing the frequency of incidence at the 
tariff line level of a particular QR for a certain product category. 
The index is expressed as a percentage that gives the share of the 
total number of tariff lines comprising a certain product group 
affected by a QR, thus 
i 
(1) FIaj - . 100 
TLJ 
where FIaA is the frequency index for NTB a, TL^j refers to a CCCN 
tariff line classified in product group j wich is subject to NTB a, and 
TLj refers to the total number of CCCN tariff lines included in product 
group j. 
The second index meets the obvious limitation of the frequency 
index, namely that it provides no insight into the volume or value of 
import trade that is actually affected by a QR. When the tariff lines 
subject to a QR are weighted by the corresponding trade flow, a 
coverage index is formulated that gives the percentage share of imports 
of a certain product group covered by a QR: 
l TkjMij 
i 
(2) CIai . 100 
where CIa^ is the coverage index for NTB a, M ^ is the import of 
product ij according for the 4 or 5-digit SITC classification that 
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corresponds to TL^ -s , and MJ refers to total import trade of product 
group j. 
The weighting procedure in calculating import-weighted average 
tariffs and coverage indices can only be properly carried out if import 
data are available at the SITC 4 and 5-digit level, to facilitate a 
close matching of the CCCN and SITC classifications, see Appendix B. 
This requirement substantially reduces the number of countries for 
which weighted measures can be computed. 
• The foregoing measures do not indicate the impact of TCMs on 
economie variables, like prices, consumption, production and trade, nor 
the economie costs arising from probable distortions of these 
variables. What they do provide is an indication of the severity .of 
trade restrictions which they entail by showing, in terms of countries 
and product groups, the average heights of tariff rates and frequency 
of occurence and trade coverage of QRs. It will be clear that the value 
of the coverage index for QRs provides quite ambiguous information. The 
index is based on the observed import value which is, of course, 
disturbed by the mere application of a QRs. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
For the purpose of this article, two levels of aggregation are 
distinguished. First, total trade in manufactures is defined as to 
comprise all products in ISIC Major Division 3 Manufacturing: see 
Appendix B. Tradeables are thus classified by industrial origin. 
Second, total manufactured trade is disaggregated into a five-sector 
classification, comprised the major product groups of nondurable 
consumer goods, beverages and tobacco, durable consumer goods, 
intermediates, and capital goods. 
The following variables will be used in a cross-country regression 
analysis to grasp the variation in tariff heights per country. To begin 
with, the level of development, approximated by GNP per capita, is 
thought to affect the height of tariff protection in two ways: (1) the 
lower the level of development, the greater will be a country's 
productivity disadvantage and hence the higher the need for protection; 
(2) the lower the level of development, the poorer will be a country's 
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fiscal and administrative infrastructure and the more important will 
tariffs be as a source of governments revenue. The expected sign in 
both instances is negative. 
Second, the variable population (POP) measures a country's 
domestic market size. The impact of this variable on the tariff height 
can also be twofold, but then in opposing directions. On the one hand, 
a large domestic market size enables a country to continue longer with 
the strategy of import substitution by moving to a second stage, 
whereas smaller countries sooner reach the limits of their domestic 
market. Hence, larger countries can afford a higher level of protection 
for a longer period, and can also better af ford the protection of 
domestic production of intermediates and producer goods, than smaller 
countries. According to this reasoning, the expected relationship 
bet-ween tariff protection and domestic market size is positive. On the 
other hand, however, a smaller domestic market size hardly allows the 
realization of economies of scale and if adequate protection of 
manufacturing is to be provided, tariffs would have to be relatively 
high to make up for the larger price difference vis-a-vis foreign 
competitors (Corden, 1980, p. 68). In addition, smaller economies do 
riot enjoy the advantage of natural protection in the- form of high 
internal transport costs. This again calls forth higher tariff 
protection. Thus, in this context, the variable POP can be expected to 
have a coëfficiënt with a negative sign. 
Third, tariff protection aims at reducing the value of competitive 
imports. It is however well-known that protection also reduces the 
value of exports through its inherent home-market bias in production. 
The variable EJJJ/VAJJJ, the share of manufactured exports in total 
manufacturing value added, represents the national preference for a 
specific level of trade, for whatever reason. This variable is not 
strictly exogenous, as the relation may well be the other way around. 
Also by means of a cross-country regression analysis, it will be 
tested whether the average tariff levels for the five distinguished 
major manufacturing product groups deviate significantly from one 
another. Given the stages in the import-substitution process, it is 
expected that, at lower levels of economie development, the tariff 
levels for consumer goods will be significantly higher than those for 
intermediate and capital goods. 
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5. Rates of Nominal Protection 
The tariff charges that are examined in this section include the 
customs and fiscal duties on imports which are mentioned in Section 3. 
As import tariffs, there is no difference between a customs and a 
f iscal duty. Yet, in a number of countries both types of duties occur 
and are levied together on import trade. In those cases, both duties 
are added up and treated as a single import tariff. 
5.1 Total Manufacturing 
Let us first consider the estimates of nominal tariff protection 
for the whole manufacturing sector, presented in Table 1. At first 
glance it is evident that this form of protection differs substantially 
per country, whether measured as unweighted or as import-weighted 
tariff averages. As expected, the import-weighted tariff rates are 
generally lower, except in Lybia, Mauritius, Niger, Somalia, Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesia. At the low extreme of unweighted nominal tariff 
protection we find Saudi Arabia and Singapore, with average rates of 
2.6 and 0.5 per cent, respectively. Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are 
at the high extreme, showing average rates of 73 to 80 per cent. It is 
remarkable to find rather high tariff averages for a number of African 
countries. In these countries in particular, both a customs and a 
fiscal duty are levied on imports. 
In the light of the GSTP negotiations, the observed wide 
intercountry differences pose a number of serious problems, assuming 
that in the first instance a linear across-the-board approach to tariff 
cutting is adopted. First, the effectiveness of a percentage tariff cut 
to stimulate South-South trade in case of a high initial tariff rate 
may be limited. A resulting preferential rate of, say, 68 per cent 
after a 15 per cent tariff cut from an initial rate of 80 per cent, may 
still constitute an insurmountable barrier for developing countries' 
manufacturing industries. Second, the very existence of -wide 
differences in initial tariff levels entails unequal or unbalanced 
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TABLE 1 Unweighted and Weighted Average Ad Valorem Import Tariff Rates 
for the Total Manufacturing Sector in Selected Developing 
Countries 
UAT IWAT 
Country 
1. Algeria 25.5 10.4 
2. Lybia 16.1 19.2 
3. Morocco 57.2 43.9 
4. Sudan 52.5 33.4 
5. Tunisia 29.7 28.7 
6. Egypt 58.3 29.1 
7. Burundi 33.5 n.a. 
8. Zaire 24.7 n.a. 
9. Ethiopia 34.3 31.3 
10. Gambia 17.4 n.a. 
11. Ghana 44.3 43.7 
12: Guinea 79.2 n.a. 
13. Ivory Coast 41.3 n.a. 
14. Kenya 45.0 43.5 
15. Liberia 28.8 • 27.0 
16. Mauritania 58.8 n.a. 
17. Mauritius 44.0 50.2 
18. Niger 18.3 22.0 
19. Nigeria 32.7 23.3 
20. Rwanda 25.1 n.a. 
21. Sierra Leone 30.2 n.a. 
22. Somalia 34.9 39.4 
23. Zimbabwe 11.9 n.a. 
24. Togo 13.8 12.5 
25. Tanzania 22.5 13.6 
26. Mexico 25.4 20.9 
27. Paraguay 11.6 9.5 
28. Bahamas 30.2 n.a. 
29. Haiti 32.1 n.a. 
30. Cyprus 20.0 18.5 
31. Iran 24.0 n.a. 
32. Saudi Arabia 2.6 3.0 
33. Syria 18.2 13.8 
34. Bangladesh 80.1 51.7 
35. Sri Lanka 41.2 26.0 
36. India 73.0 n.a. 
37. Indonesia 32.9 36.5 
38. South Korea 34.4 24.6 
39. Malays ia 16.8 12.3 
40. Nepal 28.0 n.a. 
41. Pakistan 81.1 n.a. 
42. Philippines 32.3 23.4 
43. Singapore 0.5 0.2 
44. Thailand 33.8 23.7 
45. Yugoslavia 13.0 n.a. 
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
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tariff concessions in absolute terms: high-level tariff countries 
provide higher preference margins than low-tariff countries. Moreover, 
the tariff concessions of a low tariff country may be too marginal to 
be effective as a trade preference. In the preparatory phase of the 
GSTP negotiations, these problems received due attention. But a linear 
percentage reduction was preferred to various balancing procedures, 
like tariff margins in percentage points, non-uniform tariff reductions 
and tariff harmonization formulae. The problem of unequal concessions 
will therefore continue to play a role in the negotiations. 
It is difficult to see how such high tariff levels should be 
understood: predominantly as an instrument for maximizing government 
revenues or as protection for domestic producers. High tariff rates can 
only be effective in revenue maximalization in case no close 
substitutes are available and demand is inelastic. As the manufacturing 
sectors in the large Asian countries are generally more developed and 
diversified than in the smaller African countries, it is more logical 
to view the high tariffs in Asia predominantly as pure protection, 
whereas the African countries use high tariff in the first instance as 
a revenue-maximizing instrument. This impression is supported by the 
finding that in quite a number of African countries the weighted tariff 
averages are close to or even exceeding the unweighted tariff averages, 
e.g. Libya, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Niger, 
Somalia and Togo. A better insight into this matter can be obtained 
when the tariff protection for different product groups is examined in 
the next section. 
This leads us to the first set of regression analyses to 
investigate the extent to which the variation in nominal tariff 
protection between countries can be attributed to country specific 
differences in level of economie development, domestic market size and 
preferred trade level. The results, summarized in Table 2, confirm that 
it is the country at a lower level of economie development, with a 
larger domestic market size and a lower preferred trade level that has 
the most highly protected manufacturing sectors. Among these three 
variables, the impact of the variable GNP per capita is clearly the 
most significant. The positive coëfficiënt for the variable POP leaves 
little doubt about the prevailing effect of this variable on the tariff 
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TABLE 2 Determinants of the Level of Nominal Protection for the Manufacturing 
Sector in Developing Countries (t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent In Em 
variable Constant In GNP p/c In POP. VAm n R^ F 
UAT 75.37 
(4.61) 
-7.62 
(-3.35) 
3.32 
(2.09) 
45 .33 10.14 
UAT 55.76 
(5.95) 
-6.06 
(-2.48) 
45 .12 6.13 
UAT 80.82 -6.78 3.00 -2.78 45 .35 7.30 
(4.79) (-2.86) (1.87) (-1.19) 
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
height in developing countries: the reasoning is supported that high 
tariff rates can be better afforded in larger than in smaller 
developing countries, notwithstanding the tariff-reducing impact of a 
large domestic market size in consequence of scale economies and 
relatively high transport costs. Clearly, vested interests flourish 
better in larger than in smaller countries. The regression results with 
import-weighted average tariffs as the dependent variable are not 
reproduced here; the established relationships still hold, although the 
variables perform somewhat more poorly. 
The proportion of the variance of average tariff rates that could 
be explained is rather low. Expectations about the levels of. 
explanation, however, have to be modest if it is taken into account 
that protection is measured by nominal tariffs alone, whereas, on the 
explaining side, due to data deficiencies, only three determinants of 
protection in developing countries could be included. 
5.2- Five-Sector Classification 
The five-sector classification of manufacturing production has 
been established on the basis of the nature and final use of the 
products in order to obtain a grouping of activities to which an 
economie meaning can be attached. Thus, consumer goods, intermediates 
(sector IV) and capital goods (sector V) are distinguished, with a 
further subdivision of consumer goods into nondurable consumer goods 
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(sector I), beverages and tobacco (sector II), and durable consumer 
goods (sector III). 
Apart from variation in the level of protection among countries, 
the structure of protection in developing countries shows a pattern of 
progression according to the level of fabrication. Final, mainly 
nondurable consumer goods enjoy the highest protection, intermediates, 
machinery and othe.r producer goods the lowest. Many country studies 
reveal this specific structure of protection in developing countries 
(Balassa, 1971; Krueger, et al., 1981). It is especially tuned in to 
the first or easy phase of import substitution. If a country, however, 
is gradually embarking on the second phase of import substitution, the 
structure of protection has to change accordingly. It is then to be 
expected that industries producing more sophisticated products, using 
more capital-intensive production processes with longer production 
runs, will be favoured. This means providing relatively higher levels 
of protection to durable consumer goods, intermediates and capital 
goods. The structure of protection will then become more even. 
Table 3 summarizes the estimates of nominal tariff protection for 
the five-sector classification in our sample of countries. Per major 
manufacturing product group, the first column shows unweighted tariff 
averages, whereas the second column gives import-weighted tariff 
averages. 
As to the observed differences between unweighted and import-
weighted tariff levels, it is of interest to note that unweighted 
tariff averages generally exceed weighted tariff averages in nondurable 
consumer goods, whereas the opposite holds for durable consumer goods 
and capital goods. It illustrates the high dependence on imports of 
durables and capital goods in many developing countries. This applies 
in particular to those countries in Table 1 which show high weighted 
tariff averages compared to their unweighted average tariff rate. 
The difference in tariff protection between the major 
manufacturing sectors is analyzed in two stages. First, separate 
regression analyses are run for each of the five major sectors with GNP 
per capita, population size and trade level as explainatory variables. 
This amounts to assuming a different relationship per sector. Second, 
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TABLE 3 Average Ad Valorem Import Tatiff Rates for Major Manufacturing Product Group 
in Selec :ted Developing Countries 
Sector I II III IV V 
Country UAT IWAT UAT IWAT UAT IWAT UAT IWAT UAT IWAT 
1. Algeria 51.7 21.3 83.5 26.0 38.9 27.0 16.3 9.3 6.6 6.0 
2. Lybia 26.1 23.3 50.0 1.3 24.9 32.1 11.1 15.3 11.2 12.8 
3. Morocco 98.2 94.2 164.5 198.1 81.9 66.9 45.5 40.3 34.7 37.2 
4. Sudan 80.3 64.8 558.5 60.9 90.6 114.0 38.6 20.9 31.8 27.4 
5. Tunisia 52.5 30.6 74.0 23.9 61.1 95.1 21.8 18.4 16.5 20.2 
6. Egypt 92.2 55.5 1501.3 113.6 93.5 108.3 35.3 27.5 18.2 25.8 
7. Burundi 58.7 n.a. 115.5 n.a. 58.9 n.a. 25.1 n.a. 25.2 n. a. 
8. Zaire 38.0 n.a. 108.9 n.a. 48.2 n.a. 22.6 n.a. 14.0 n.a. 
9. Ethiopia 52.7 42.5 55.0 33.7 32.0 51.4 32.8 18.2 16.9 36.3 
10. Gambia 24.5 n.a. - - 30.0 n.a. 15.6 n.a. 13.4 n.a. 
11. Ghana 56.5 51.6 110.0 114.6 72.6 73.4 39.6 34.5 34.7 30.8 
12. Guinea 121.3 n.a. 176.6 n.a. 114.6 n.a. 65.4 n.a. 59.1 n.a. 
13. Ivory Coast 53.3 n.a. 59.6 n.a. 50.8 n.a. 41.3 n.a. 28.3 n.a. 
14. Kenya 63.7 53.7 99.3 104.0 59.8 99.0 41.6 32.5 29.1 30.7 
15. Liberia 42.3 31.8 53.2 60.8 39.2 29.5 21.7 28.3 19.6 18.1 
16. Mauritania 77.9 n.a. 102.9 n.a. 70.0 n.a. 56.0 n.a. 43.0 n.a. 
17. Mauritius 64.7 19.8 184.8 232.7 100.8 159.4 26.0 34.8 45.2 75.5 
18. Niger 25.8 17.4 33.0 41.5 21.9 31.5 17.3 22.6 12.0 20.8 
19. Nigeria 48.1 42.0 102.6 0.0 48.4 37.0 30.7 25.2 20.5 18.4 
20. Rwanda 44.8 n.a. 96.3 n.a. 35.3 n.a. 21.1 n.a. 13.1 n. a. 
21. Sierra Leone 42.8 "n.a. 51.1 n.a. 42.5 n.a. 24.8 n. a. 19.4 n.a. 
22. Somalia 50.3 45.5 189.0 289.5 44.2. 62.2 28.7 26.0 17.4 9.2 
23. Zimbabwe 22.1 n.a. 28.0 n.a. 21.2 • n.a. 9.5 n.a. 6.9 n.a. 
24. Togo 18.0 16.6 19.6 28.2 19.0 11.1 15.9 13.0 6.5 6.7 
25. Tanzania 32.2 33.7 87.5 98.5 18.1 27.4 21.3 9.7 14.4 15.2 
26. Mexico 54.5 50.5 53.1 53.9 60.6 62.5 21.8 17.9 17.8 20.9 
27. Paraguay 14.6 16.1 13.8 12.1 12.1 13.4 11.8 9.9 6.6 5.6 
28. Bahamas 27.0 n.a. 44.6 n.a. 37.0 n.a. 30.8 n.a. 31.4 n.a. 
29. Haiti 41.2 n.a. 46.5 n.a. 38.7 n.a. 33.6 n.a. 15.3 n.a. 
30. Cyprus 41.9 37.0 31.5 23.7 29.2 36.6 11.8 11.5 12.4 17.0 
31. Iran 42.6 n.a. .70.3 n.a. 25.2 n.a. 19.6 n.a. 12.3 n. a. 
32. Saudi Arabia 3.8 3.8 2.8 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.4 2.7 1.2 2.4 
33. Syria 29.5 20.2 101.9 97.2 31.1 19.6 12.2 11.4 13.5 14.7-
34. Bangladesh 120.6 54.0 159.7 310.6 93.0 76.9 69.2 45.2 56.3 54.8 
35. Sri Lanka 74.7 45.9 271.4 313.3 59.5 39.9 32.4 25.3 20.5 20.6 
36. India 92.6 n.a. 168.1 n.a. 76.9 n.a. 71.2 n.a. 57.7 . n.a. 
37. Indonesia 52.2 45.1 55.2 58.1 52.7 76.0 28.0 20.5 22.7 40.7 
38. South Korea 52.7 39.0 132.8 149.9 60.9 48.7 30.9 27.7 20.6 18.0 • 
39. Malaysia 22.4 18.9 43.9 46.5 32.4 32.7 14.8 9.3 9.7 12.7 
40. Nepal 48.3 n.a. 153.5 n.a. 76.0 n.a. 18.3 n.a. 14.4 n.a. 
41. Pakistan 115.0 n.a. 176.9 n.a. 126.6 n.a. 80.1 n.a. 45.7 n.a. 
42. Philippines 52.1 30.5 48.6 50.0 46.8 33.0 28.6 22.6 20.3 22.4 
43. Singapore 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 
44. Thailand 60.1 35.8 55.4 54.4 49.7 75.2 27.9 19.8 17.8 20.5 
45. Yugoslavia 16.1 n.a. 21.1 n.a. 17.4 n.a. 11.5 n. a. 13.8 n.a. 
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
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it is postulated that the three explainatory variables have the same 
effect on the tariff height per sector and that sector characteristics 
are reponsible for different tariff levels. In other words, the 
regression coefficients are assumed to be the same, whereas the sector 
differences show up in the intercept and the dummy variables. A dummy 
variable is assigned to four out of the five product groups. The 
results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. Here too, regression were run 
with both 'unweighted and import-weighted tariff averages as dependent 
variables. Only the results for the unweighted tariff averages are 
presented, as the results for the import-weighted tariff averages do 
not provide new insights, apart from being generally poorer. 
From Table 4, it can be observed that the explanatory variables 
have generally the same effect on the average tariff level in the 
various sectors: apart fron some variation in the value of the 
coefficients, they all bear consistently the expected sign in each 
sector regression. By contrast, major differences are observed for the 
values of the intercepts, about which more will be said below. The 
regression for sector I shows the best results: all above-elaborated 
determinants of protection in developing countries are the most 
relevant for nondurable consumer goods of the easy •phase of import 
substitution. In particular, the variable for domestic market size 
performs well. This finding is the more striking as nondurables are 
generally not subject to important economies of scale. This would imply 
an insignificant relationship and in any case not a strong positive 
one. An obvious explaination suggests that vested interests flourish 
better in larger than in smaller countries. 
The results for sector II are poor by any Standard. This is not 
surprising as beverages and tobacco are two of those typical luxury 
goods which, apart from balance-of-payments or revenue considerations, 
are quite often heavily taxed for ideological and religous reasons. 
Consequently, the average tariff rate for beverages and tobaccos show 
an extreme variation across countries, ranging from zero in Singapore 
and Gambia to over 1,500 per cent in Egypt, 550 per cent in Sudan and 
between 150 and 200 per cent in Morocco, Guinea, Mauritius, Somalia, 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Moreover, the zero and very low tariff 
rates do not necessarily mean that imports of beverages and tobacco are 
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TABLE 4 Determinants of the Level of Nominal Protection per Major Manufacturing Sector 
Developing Countries (t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent 
variables Constant In GNPp/c In Pop. In
 Em 
VAm 
n R2 F 
UAT SECTOR I 92.60 
(3.67) 
-8.97 
(-2.60) 
5.19 
(2.23) 
-5.03 
(-1.49) 
45 .37 8.04 
ÜAT SECTOR II 173..67 
( .71) 
-19.00 
(- .57) 
23.76 
(1.05) 
-23.18 
( -71) 
45 .07 1.08 
ÜAT SECTOR III 96.79 
(3.50) 
-8.94 
(-2.37) 
3.72 
(1.46) 
-2.82 
(-.76) 
45 .25 4.51 
UAT SECTOR IV 61.19 
(3.90) 
-6.40 
(-2.99) 
3.02 
(2.08) 
-2.00 
(-.95) 
45 .36 7.70 
UAT SECTOR V 43.36 
(3.07) 
-4.04 
(-2.09) 
.97 
(.74) 
-2.29 
(-1.21) 
45 .21 3.59 
Note: For sources and explanations of symbols, see Appendix B 
free. On the contrary, as will be shown in next section, beverages and 
tobacco are quite often subject to specific tariff rates and QRs. It 
should, moreover, be noted that our estimates do not include the often 
occurring special taxes on beverages and tobacco under heading 11.2 of 
the TIS inventory, as these taxes are intepreted as not strictly trade 
restraining. 
The regression for sectors III, IV and V show rather similar 
results. The variable GNP per capita is statistically significant and 
bears the expected sign, whereas,compared to the results for sector I, 
the levels of significance for the variables POP and E^V^ are 
substantially lower. Only for intermediates it can be maintained, as 
indicated by the positive and siginificant effect of the variable POP, 
that in larger countries serious efforts are undertaken to move to 
second-stage import substitution by providing tariff protection to 
domestic production of intermediates. There are probably still too few 
countries that started replacement of imports of capital goods to 
conclude the same for this type of second-stage import-substitution 
goods. 
The difference between the tariff levels per sector are clearly 
revealed by the regression results represented in Table 5. Note that 
18 
TABLE 5 Determinants of the Level of Nominal Protection for Major Manufacturing Sector 
Developing Countries (t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent Em 
variable Constant D3 D4 D5 InGNP p/c InPOP In n R2 F 
UAT 
excl. 86.85 -1.17 -22.65 -29.64 -7.09 3.22 -3.04 180 .45 23.54 
Sector II (7.88) (-.28) (-5.37) (-7.02) (-4.85) (3.26) (-2.11) 
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
sector II has been excluded because of its peculiar characteristics 
discussed above. By postulating a commom set of slope coefficients over 
the four remaining sectors, the differential sector effect is revealed 
by the coëfficiënt for the relevant dummy variable as compared to the 
intercept value, which represents the effect for the sector to which no 
dummy variable has been assigned. Thus, the regression in Table 5 
implies that, given the level of economie development, domestic market 
size and preferred trade level, the average tariff levels for sectors I 
and III do not deviate significantly from one another. There is also 
nosignificant difference between the average tariff levels for sectors 
IV and V. By contrast, the average tariff levels for sectors IV and V 
indeed appear to be significantly lower than those for sectors I and 
III. On average, tariffs for sector IV are a quarter, and for sector V 
a third, lower than those for sectors I and III. Moreover, the results 
in Table 5 show that the overall level of explanation as well as the 
significance of the three explaining variables improve if due account 
is taken of a differential sector effect as compared to an average for 
total manufacturing. 
In sum, the structure of nominal protection in developing 
countries is clearly characterized by a bipartition between consumer 
and producer goods. The analysis also suggests that, although domestic 
production in many developing countries has advanced now to sectors III 
and IV, this progress as yet did not lead to a general tariff reduction 
for sector I goods. Furthermore, the existing structure of nominal 
production provides the least incentive for capital goods industries. 
In fact, in terms of effective protection, this incentive is completely 
absent or even negative in many a developing country. The result of 
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such a protection structure is that, on the one hand, the import of 
capital goods is encouraged, while on the other hand there is little or 
no incentive for the domestic production of such goods (Nugent, 1985, 
p.111). Consequently, the dependence on the North as supplier of 
capital goods is perpetuated by the developing countries' own 
protection policy. 
6. Specific Tariffs and Quantitative Restrictions 
In this sëction, a descriptive analysis is provided of specific 
tariffs and QRs restraining import trade. Our interest lies in 
ascertaining, first, the amount of trade subject to specific tariffs 
and QRs and second, whether any apparent structure to the incidence of 
specific tariffs and QRs can be discerned from the available data, and 
to what extent this structure, if any, corresponds to or deviates from 
the specific structure of tariff protection in developing countries.Due 
to data deficiencies, the sample of countries for which QRs could be 
examined is reduced to 18. 
• 6.1 Frequency and Coverage of Specific Tariffs 
Tables 6 and 7 contain the frequency and coverage indices of 
specific tariff rates for total manufacturing import trade and for the 
five-sector subdivision, respectively. Examining these tables provides 
us with the following information. 
Specific tariffs are a widely used instrument of trade policy. Out 
of the 45 countries contained in the sample, 39 recorded their 
application. Apart 'from six exceptions, however, the frequency of 
specific tariff rates is low, generally not exceeding a few per cent, 
sometimes only a few tenths of a percentage point. The exceptions refer 
to Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand where the 
frequency index ranges between 5 and 10 per cent, and above all Haiti 
with a frequency index of 27.4 per cent. 
It appears that the coverage index exceeds the frequency index in 
all cases, except Indonesia. In a few cases, this difference is 
substantial. The highest value of the coverage index is recorded for 
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Niger, where 27.0 per cent of manufacturing import trade is affected by 
specific tariffs. High values of the coverage index are recorded also 
f of Ethiopia, Syria, Malaysia and Thailand, i.e. 22.0, 23.4, 23.1 and 
19.2 per cent, respectively. This suggests that the application of 
specific tariffs is an effective device to collect government revenues. 
For Indonesia, protectionist reasons seem to prevail in applying 
specific tariffs. 
Specific tariffs are unequally distributed among the various 
product groups. As can be seen from the five-sector division in Table 
7, they are most frequently applied to " imports of beverages and 
tobacco, foliowed by nondurable consumer goods and intermediates. 
Durable consumer goods and capital goods are rarely affected by 
specific tariffs. 
A closer examination of the incidence of specific tariffs at the 
product level reveals some interesting features. It appears that both 
beverages and tobacco are heavily subjected to specific tariffs in the 
majority of countries, although there seems to be a higher preference 
to impose specific tariffs on tobacco. Not uncommon is a coverage index 
of 100 or close to 100 per' cent. Generally, the incidence of specific 
tariff rates on nondurable consumer goods is rather low, except for 
some food products which pushes up the average, in a number of 
countries the coverage index in particular. This is almost exclusively 
due to one product, namely refined sugar. Among the intermediates, 
textiles, industrial chemicals, other chemical products, and petroleum 
distillates and manufactures emerge as the product groups where 
specific tariffs frequently occur. In many countries, the coverage 
index for imports of petroleum distillates is particularly high. A 
specific tariff is most frequently imposed on motor spirit, aviation 
spirit and gas oils. The textiles that are subjected in a number of 
countries usually include cotton yarn and fabrics, and synthetic 
fibres. 
In fact, only four specific products are severely affected, namely 
refined sugar, beverages, tobacco and various light petroleum oils. The 
preference for these four products can be attributed to a number of 
characteristics they have in common. First, trade in these goods can 
easily be expressed in quantity terms as they are fairly homogeneous 
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TABLE 6 Frequency and Coverage Indices of Specific Tariffs for the 
Total Manufacturing Sector in Selected Developing Countries 
Country FI Cl 
1. Algeria - -
2. Libya - -
3. Morocco 0.2 0.6 
4. Sudan 1.0 7.2 
5. Tunisia 0.2 0.4 
6. Egypt 0.2 0.7 
7. Burundi 1.4 n.a. 
8. Zaire 0.9 n.a. 
9. Ethiopia 9.9 22.0 
10. Gambia 3.3 n.a. 
11. Ghana 2.7 4.1 
12. Guinea 0.5 n.a. 
13. Ivory Coast 1.1 n.a. 
14. Kenya 1.9 5.6 
15. Liberia 2.2 8.4 
16. Mauritania - -
17. Mauritius 0.4 1.1 
18. Niger 0.9 27.0 
19. Nigeria 2.9 5.1 
20. Rwanda 0.9 n.a. 
21. Sierra Leone 1.7 n.a. 
22. Somalia 0.9 2.7 
23. Zimbabwe 4.3 n.a. 
24. Togo 1.1 14.2 
25. Tanzania 0.7 3.4 
26. Mexico - -
27. Paraguay - -
28. Bahamas 3.4 n.a. 
29. Haiti 27.4 n.a. 
30. Cyprus 2.6 5.6 
31. Iran 3.0 n.a. 
32. Saudi Arabia 0.4 0.9 
33. Syria 4.0 23.4 
34. Bangladesh 1.6 14.3 
35. Sri Lanka 1.4 18.5 
36. India 1.8 n.a. 
37. Indonesia 8.7 1.4 
38. South Korea 0.1 4.9 
39. Malays ia 9.8 23.1 
40. Nepal 5.8 n.a. 
41. Pakistan 7.3 n.a. 
42. Philippines 1.3 9.2 
43. Singapore 3.2 9.0 
44. Thailand 5.0 19.2 
45. Yugoslavia - -
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
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TABLE 7 Frequency and Coverage Indices of Specific Tariffs for Major 
Manufacturing Sector in Selected Developing Countries. 
Sector I 
Country FI Cl 
1. Algeria - -
2. Libya - -
3. Morocco - -
4. Sudan 0.4 0.4 
5. Tunisia 0.4 0.0 
6. Egypt - -
7. Burundi - -
8. Zaire - -
9. Ethiopia 2.5 29.5 
10. Gambia 1.7 n.a, 
11. Ghana 0.9 5.6 
12. Guinea 0.3 n.a, 
13. Ivory Coast 0.3 n.a, 
14. Kenya 0.6 1.2 
15. Liberia 0.5 7.6 
16. Mauritania - -
17. Mauritius - -
18. Niger 0.1 1.1 
19. Nigeria 3.8 23.6 
20. Rwanda - -
21. Sierra Leone 0.5 n. a 
22. Somalia 0.7 7.7 
23. Zimbabwe 2.0 n.a 
24. Togo 0.3 22.4 
25. Tanzania 0.6 18.6 
26. Mexico _ _ 
27. Paraguay - -
28. Bahamas 2.4 n.a 
29. Haiti 16.4 n.a 
30. Cyprus 2.1 10.4 
31. Iran - -
32. Saudi Arabia - -
33. Syria 2.2 41.4 
34. Bangladesh - -
35. Sri Lanka 2.0 79.1 
36. India 0.3 n.a 
37. Indonesia 27.3 6.2 
38. South Korea 0.6 59.1 
39. Malaysia 8.7 48.8 
40. Nepal 1.6 n.a 
41. Pakistan 1.3 n.a 
42. Philippines 0.2 0.6 
43. Singapore 1.3 2.8 
44. Thailand 2.9 30.8 
II 
FI Cl 
III 
FI Cl, 
IV 
FI Cl 
V 
FI Cl 
45. Yugoslavia 
17. 9 87. ,9 
47. ,4 98. ,5 
12. ,5 92. ,0 
27. ,3 94. ,6 
70. ,3 n. ,a 
66. ,7 n. ,a 
79. ,3 86. ,4 
100.0 n. ,a 
78. ,6 91. ,3 
14. .9 n, ,a 
51, .6 65, .5 
57, .8 60. ,3 
25, .4 65, .6 
68, .2100, .0 
'61, .9 n, .a 
51, .1 n, .a 
82, .1 n, .a 
58, .8 97 .7 
27, .3 89, .7 
1.4 0.0 
0.9 14.3 
0.7 n.a 
0.6 n.a 
16.3 35.7 
3.2 n.a 
2.4 5.9 
0.9 n.a 
1.5 n.a 
2.0 11.1 
2.1 17.5 
0.8 1.8 
0.6 45.9 
2.8 4.8 
0.4 n.a 
1.2 n.a 
1.5 3.1 
5.0 n.a 
0.6 5.4 
0.6 4.5 
0.7 0.0 
45.8 n.a. 20.8 n.a. 2.7 n.a. 1.1 n.a 
5.2 n.a. 2.0 n.a. 42.2 n.a. 4.5 n.a 
77.8 99.7 - - 2.7 5.8 - -
- - - - 6.1 n.a. - -
37.0 62.1 - - 0.2 0.0 - -
25.0 81.9 5.1 23.4 5.3 23.6 ' 1.9 16.1 
33.3 10.6 - - 2.0 25.0 0.5 0.0 
66.7 79.5 2.0 3.3 0.3 3.8 0.3 0.2 
11.1 n.a. - - 2.6 n.a. - -
34.0 17.1 2.2 1.2 1.8 2.0 - -
27.3 41.1 9.7 1.9 12.9 45.8 2.4 0.5 
5.0 n.a. - - 10.4 n.a. - -
60.0 n.a. 4.3 n.a. 11.4 n.a. 0.5 n.a 
26.3 64.1 - - 1.9 17.8 - -
86.0 52.9 5.4 1.0 2.1 20.9 - -
7.1 0.1 - - 7.8 31.4 0.3 0.9 
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
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products, a precondition for applying specific rates. Second, they can 
be conceived as luxury goods. Third, imports of these products often do 
not compete with domestic substitutes and/or demand is rather 
inelastic. For these very reasons, the imposition of specific tariff 
rates on exactly these four products can serve the purpose of 
collecting government revenues. 
There are, of course, also protectionist grounds involved in the 
application of specific tariffs. In quite a number of countries, 
various textile products are subjected to specific tariffs and this is 
a clear instance of protection. In Indonesia, Malaysia and to a lesser 
extent Ethiopia, a broad range of consumer goods and intermediates is 
affected by specific tariffs, like various food products, textiles, 
clothing (Indonesia), footwear (Indonesia), rubber products, plastic 
products, iron and steel, cement and lamps. By these specific tariffs, 
no doubt, domestic industry is provided protection. In general, 
however, the application of a specific tariff as a protectionist device 
does not seem to be very effective. 
6.2 The Incidence of Three Groups of Quantitative Restrictions 
Table 8 summarizes the frequency and coverage indices of QRs on total 
manufacturing import trade in 18 developing countries broken down in 
three groups of measures: restrictive licensing procedures, various 
types of quotas and import prohibitions for whatever reason; see 
Section 3. However, the identification of types of restrictions is 
sometimes ambiguous. Not infrequently, one tariff line is subjected to 
more than one type of restriction. For instance, different types of 
import licences are required, or an import licence is required while in 
addition an import quota is in force. In calculating the frequency and 
coverage indices, instances of two or more QRs applied to one tariff 
line are classified by the a priori least restrictive' restriction. 
Moreover, the application of a restriction is sometimes partial. In a 
number of countries, this is especially the case with a total import 
prohibition, while the grounds for exceptional treatment are not 
specified. The indices in Table 8 include all QRs, whether partial or 
not. 
QRs apply on average to 19.2 per cent (weighted average equals 
17.1 per cent) of the tariff lines in the sample countries, while the 
trade coverage of these restrictions amounts on average to 26.5 per 
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TABLE 8 Frequency and Coverage Indices of Three Types of Quantitative 
Restrictions for Total Manufacturing Import Trade in Selected 
Developing Countries 
All Quantitative Licensing Quotas Prohibitions 
Country Restrictions 
FI Cl FI Cl FI Cl FI Cl 
1. Libya 0.7 0.0 - - - - 0.7 0.0 
2. Ghana 69.4 56.5 50.9 54.0 - - 18.5 2.5 
3. Kenya 25.1 19.9 - - 25.1 19.9 - -
4. Liberia 4.0 .- 8.1 3.4 5.6 - - 0.6 2.5 
5. Nigeria 56.5 53.7 44.3 52.1 - - 12.2 1.6 
6. Togo 2.9 10.1 2.9 10.1 - - - -
7. Mexico 6.5 20.1 6.4 19.8 0.1 0.3 
8. Cyprus 26.7 47.2 26.7 47.2 - - " - -
9. Saudi Arabia 9.7 1.5 9.1 1.4 - - 0.6 0.1 
10. Bangladesh 25.6 45.9 22.6 34.4 0.2 0.5 2.8 11.0 
11. Sri Lanka 19.5 49.3 19.5 49.3 - - - -
12. Indonesia 10.1 32.8 9.7 31.2 0.1 1.5 0.3 0.1 
13. South Korea 23.0 47.9 23.0 47.9 - - - -
14. Malaysia 3.0 6.1 2.7 6.0 - - 0.3 0.1 
15. Pakistan 36.7 34.8 36.5 34.8 0.2 0.0 - -
16. Phi-lippines 13.5 27.9 - - 13.2 27.7 0.3 0.2 
17. S ingapore 4.8 3.1 4.6 3.1 - - 0.2 0.0 
18. Thailand 7.7 11.8 4.3 . 7.0 - - 3.4 4.8 
Unweighted mean 19.2 26.5 
Weighted mean 17.1 16.3 
14.8 22.4 2.2 2.8 2.2 1.3 
15.1 14.8 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
cent (weighted average equals 16.3 per cent). The most widely used 
measures are licensing procedures. They are employed in 15 out of the 
18 sample countries and affect on average 14.8 per cent (weighted 
average equals 15.1 per cent) of the tariff lines and 22.4 per cent 
(weighted average equals 14.8 per cent) of manufactured imports. Next 
in incidence are import prohibitions, affecting on average 2.2 per cent 
(weighted average equals 1.5 per cent) of the tariff lines. That an 
import prohibition is not always absolute appears from the fact the 
still 1.3 per cent (weighted average equals 0.5 per cent) of the sample 
countries' manufactured imports are accounted for by "prohibited" 
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imports. It is surprising to find that quota systems to restrain 
imports are far from popular in the sample countries. In fact, only 
Kenya and the Philippines make extensive use of import quotas. 
These averages, however, conceal a great variation per country in 
the frequency and trade coverage of QRs. The highest values of both the 
frequency index and the coverage index are recorded for Ghana, i. e. 
69.4 and 56.5 per cent, respectively, the lowest values for Libya, i.e. 
0.7 and 0.0 per cent respectively. In countries like Ghana, Kenya and 
Saudi Arabia, the frequency index of total QRs is higher than the 
corresponding coverage index. The opposite, a substantially higher 
value for the coverage than for the frequency index, holds for 
countries like Cyprus, Sri Lanka, South Korea and the Philippines. The 
impression is gained that, apart from intercountry variation in the 
frequency of application, there have to be marked differences per 
country in the nature, intention and effectiveness of types of QRs. 
This becomes clear from the following examples. 
Imports of some meat products and beverages are strictly 
prohibited in Libya. There are no escape-clauses, nor is there an 
import tariff applicable, and consequently, the coverage index equals 
nil. In Liberia, by contrast, imports of sugar preparations face a 
formal import ban. Yet, import duties ranging from 15 to 96 per cent 
are levied on imports of various preparations and in fact 2.5 per cent 
of Liberia's manufactured imports is made up of sugar preparations. 
Bangladesh and Thailand apply both total and partial import 
prohibitions for a wide range of products, which at the same time face 
import tariffs. For both categories of import prohibitions, imports are 
registered, accounting for 11.0 and 4.8 per cent of total manufactured 
imports in Bangladesh and Thailand, respectively. This is of course not 
to say that the prohibition measures in these countries have no trade-
restraining effect. They certainly have, be it as result of the mere 
uncertainty of their implementation. 
More or less the same goes for the various restrictive licensing 
procedures. In the most frequently used procedures, the import licence 
is granted simply if administrative requirements are met or on a case-
by-case basis; see Section 3. These procedures are widely in use in, 
e.g., South Korea. They primarily function as a monitoring system of 
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the imports of specific products and the case-by-case permission 
becomes binding when the need is feit to regulate these imports. These 
licensing procedures as such can thus be discretionary and liberal, as 
is evident from the 47.9 per cent share of manufactured imports that is 
covered by a licence requirement in South Korea. Licensing procedures 
in Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Indonesia also do not seem to 
constitute insurmountable barriers to imports. This is clearly not the 
case in Saudi Arabia, where over 9.1 per cent of the tariff lines 
record the requirement of an import licence which formally is granted 
if administrative procedures are met. Apparently, these procedures are 
so cumbersome and hence so restrictive that the coverage index equals 
only 1.4 per cent. The uncertainty concerning the trade-restraining 
impact is particularly significant for the "exceptional licence" 
procedure for goods that are normally prohibited. Among the countries 
contained in the sample, Nigeria and Pakistan use this "exceptional 
licence" procedure most extensively, showing frequency indices of 44.3 
and 36.5 per cent, respectively. However, the high values of the 
corresponding coverage indices of 52.1 and 34.8 per cent, respectively, 
illustrate that this licensing procedure is not very exceptional. 
It can be inferred from the foregoing observations that the 
intention behind and consequent applicatibn of a QR exercises a 
deci'sive impact on its trade-restraining effect, not the specific form 
or type of a QR. Hence, in reflecting on a structure to the incidence 
of QRs in the next section, no further account is taken of the 
different types of QRs. 
6.3 Structure to the Incidence of Quantitative Restrictions. 
According to the data presented in Table 9, QRs occur in each of 
the five distinguished major sectors in almost all sample countries. 
In absolute numbers, about two-third of the QRs applied by the sample 
countries are directed against the imports of intermediates and capital 
goods, about one-third is directed against consumer goods, mainly 
nondurables. In relative terms, however, the incidence structure is 
less distinct. Indeed, both the weighted and unweighted averages of the 
frequency index per product group suggest a structure to the incidence 
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of QRs similar to the specific structure of tariff protection in 
developing countries. Thus, the greatest relative frequencies are 
found, in descending order, for beverages and tobacco, durable consumer 
goods and nondurable consumer goods, at some distance foliowed by 
capital goods and intermediates. Compared to the structure of tariff 
protection, only intermediates and capital goods interchanged their 
position. Measured by relative frequencies, clearly the fewest QRs are 
imposed against imports of intermediates. 
These averages, however, mask sharp intercountry differences. The 
data in Table 9 indicate that in 11 countries a structure to the 
incidence of QRs is found similar to the above-treated average 
structure. In the remaining 7 countries, on the contrary, QRs occur 
either with a more or less uniform frequency across sectors or with the 
greatest relative frequency against imports of intermediates and/or 
capital goods. Such an a-specific structure, where imports of capital 
goods in particular are affected most severely by QRs, is found in 
countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The frequency index of QRs 
applied in these countries on imports of capital goods equals 53.8 and 
43.2 per cent, respectively. High values of these indices for capital 
goods are recorded also in Ghana, Nigeria and South Korea, namely 60.6, 
61.0 and 38.4 per cent, respectively. 
With the above-made reservation on the ambiguous nature of the 
information of coverage indices in mind, yet these indices, also 
presented in Table 9, give rise to the following observations. First, 
the unweighted averages of the coverage indices per sector show the 
same structure as that revealed by the frequency measures. The trade 
coverages per sector according to the corresponding weighted average 
values show a somewhat deviating structure. This, however, is solely 
caused by the very large weight of Libya's imports of nondurable 
consumer goods in the total of the sample countries, namely almost two-
thirds, whereas Libya's coverage index for this sector equals zero. If 
Libya, in turn, is disregarded, the weighted average coverage indices 
per sector show a pattern more in line with the structure revealed by 
the frequency indices, although the difference per sector varies very 
little. 
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TABLE 9 Frequency and Coverage Indices of Total Quantitative Restrictions fo 
Major Manufacturing Sectors in Selected Developing Countries 
Sector I II III IV V 
Country FI Cl FI Cl FI Cl FI Cl FI Cl 
1. Libya 0.8 0.0 72.7 0.0 - - 0.1 0.0 - -
2. Ghana 84.8 84.5 85.7 83.4 91.3 99.3 63.2 43.0 60.6 66.8 
3. Kenya 57.9 19.0 12.9 5.6 31.9 80.7 17.4 14.7 8.5 18.7 
4. Liberia 6.1 22.9 - - - - 3.8 11.3 1.5 1.0 
5. Nigeria 70.8 52.6 100.0 100.0 80.0 88.3 45.7 41.8 61.0 60.1 
6. Togo 1.4 7.1 - - 10.9 80.9 2.6 5.7 4.2 9.2 
7. Mexico 32.4 41.8 72.4 99.7 35.2 79.2 2.i 5.4 1.2 25.7 
8. Cyprus 37.2 38.5 61.1 52.0 15.2 70.9 20.0 41.4 31.9 55.8 
9. Saudi Arabia • 2.6 0.8 - - 1.7 0.0 15.7 1.3 5.7 2.3 
10. Bangladesh 18.8 85.9 3.7 5.8 40.3 91.4 18.9 33.4 53.8 57.9 
11. Sri Lanka 4.3 79.7 - - 16.3 51.3 17.8 30.7 43.2 53.6 
12-. Indonesia 2.7 11.9 - - 14.3 47.5 12.6 19.7 14.0 50.1 
13. South Korea 37.0 85.3 64.8 99.2 60.Ö 66.4 8.3 36.6 38.4 51.2 
14. Malaysia 3.4 28.2 22.7 82.0 11.8 0.0 1.6 6.9 3.0 0.0 
15. Pakistan 67.2 47.9 95.0 100.0 57.4 47.3 27.2 16.8 28.6 73.1 
16. Philippines 2.2 1.2 42.9 82.9 29.3 100.0 15.8 32.1 16.4 22.3 
17. Singapore 5.3 9.3 20.9 30.1 19.6 1.1 3.5 3.6 3.4 0.9 
18. Thailand 9.1 32.6 21.4 78.9 8.6 47.9 7.2 5.9 7.1 14.7 
Unweighted means 24.7 36.1 37.6 45.5 29.1 52.9 15.8' 19.5 21.3 31.3 
Weighted means 
(exclusive of 
Libya) 
22.6 8.0 32.7 25.4 28.9 22.9 13.2 
(23.3) (26.4) (24.8) 
14.9 18.2 22.6 
(15.5) (23.7 
Note: For sources and explanation of symbols, see Appendix B 
Second," a comparison of frequency and coverage indices per sector 
reveals that the coverage index takes both substantially lower and 
substantially higher values than the frequency index. This again 
indicates the difference in purpose of the measures employed. While for 
some product groups the main aim seems to be protection of domestic 
industry, for other product groups balance-of-payments considerations 
are likely to be paramount. The protection aim seems to be most 
relevant for nondurable consumer goods, whereas QRs directed against 
imports of durable consumer goods, intermediates and capital goods 
also, and sometimes mainly, serve the purpose of monitoring the 
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balance-of-payments position. From this and from the relatively high 
share of capital goods' imports covered by QRs, it can be inferred 
that, although all QRs are uncertain in their implementation, this 
seems to be especially true of QRs on capital goods. Even those 
restrictions on capital goods which have in the first instance primarly 
a monitoring function, can become clearly regulating and restrictive in 
time of balance-of-payments problems. The administrative procedures 
already exist, and only have to be tightened if the need is feit. 
7. Implications for the GSTP 
Of course, only an incomplete picture of TCMs in developing 
countries could be presented, based on tariff charges and QRs on 
manufacturing import trade. The investigations did not include NTBs 
like money and finance measures to control imports, state trading 
monopoly and special entry procedures. Nor could attention be paid to 
the cumulative impact of the simultaneous application of several TCMs, 
a quite common phenomenon in many developing countries, and the 
numerous partial applications and exemptions from TCMs employed. This 
oomplexity and intransparency as such makes a precise evaluation of the 
protection structure in developing countries rather difficult. 
Nevertheless, if the structure of tarif f s and QRs are seen in the 
context of the GSTP negotiations, some features come to the fore. 
The analysis shows that the wide intercountry variations in 
average tariff levels are largely explained by differences in the level 
of economie development. A linear tariff reduction entails unequal 
concessions and foregone Government revenues. Although this is the most 
•relevant for the least developed countries with the highest tariff 
levels, the analysis shows that there is in fact a sliding scale in 
tariff levels. To increase the willingness of countries to join a GSTP, 
it is perhaps recommendable to make the percentage of a linear tariff 
reduction dependent on a country's income level, or different classes 
of income levels, such that low-income, high-tariff countries are faced 
with lower percentage reductions. This procedure balances the 
concessions and mitigates the loss of government revenues. At the 
product level, it may also limit the need for exceptions to the general 
rule. 
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The data clearly indicate that both tariffs and QRs show a similar 
structure in affecting different manufacturing sectors, on the 
understanding, however, that QRs are directed with a relatively higher 
frequency against imports of capital goods. Thus, consumer goods enjoy 
a significantly higher level of protection than intermediates and 
capital goods. The structures of tariffs and QRs are mutually 
reinforcing. This entails the risk of a shift from tariffs to QRs in 
the trade regimes. There does not even need to be a deliberate shift. 
If more than one TCM is present, it is conceivable that reduction in 
one increases the effectiveness of the other. This holds irrespective 
of a standstill in the area of NTBs, as is agreed upon during the GSTP 
negotiations. The results of the analysis suggest that substitution 
between tariffs and QRs is most relevant for import regimes of capital 
goods. 
In reflecting on the specific structure of protection in 
develop'ing countries, it is, first of all, of interest to note that 
relatively labour-intensive industries still enjoy the highest 
protection, notwithstanding the relative labour abundance in these 
countries. This clearly indicates the presence of strong defensive 
forces in first-phase industries in the import-substitution sector. 
Second, in the case of a linear approach to tariff reduction, exactly 
these industries are faced with the highest preferential tariff 
margins. Third, by contrast, preferential tariff margins in favour of 
developing countries will be the lowest for capital goods, whereas the 
low level of protection for capital goods provides hardly any incentive 
to start a large-scale import-substitution process for capital goods in 
the South. This is the more so if it is realized that the average 
tariffs on capital goods presented in this study are based on legal 
tariffs rather than on duties actually applied. In the context of 
special incentives to promote export of manufactures, tariff exemptions 
on imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods used in export 
production have become a regular phenomenon in an increasing number of 
developing countries (Verbruggen, 1987, Chs. 11-17). In this case, 
tariff protection and, consequently, a possible preferential tariff 
margin are even nil. In other words, on the one hand, developing 
countries' own protection policy has created a hard to dismantle system 
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of protection favouring consumer industries. On the other hand, 
probably insufficiënt incentives are provided to promote South-South 
trade in capital goods, a major ground in the pleas for a GSTP. 
Consequently, to give South-South trade in capital goods a real 
impetus, additional preferential trading arrangements, covering a range 
of measures, seem necessary. 
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